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H.: Contracts, Specific Performance--Statute of Limitations
WEST FIRGINIA LAW

QUARTERLY

Darby v- Pierce, 17 Idaho 697, 107 Pac. 484; Perry v. Salt Lake
City, 7 Utah 143, 25 Pac. 739. An ordinance may be valid on its
face, but which if improperly applied, may become unconstitutionaL Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. Where a municipal
-corporation has authority to regulate pool rooms under the police
power, the plaintiff can not be heard to complain of the loss of
bis property because he will be considered as having knowingly
engaged in an occupation without the protection of the Federal
Constitution and which lawfully could be regulated out of existlence. Murpltey v. California,supra. Social interests demand and
authority sanctions the decision in the principal case.
-H. C. H.

UONTRAO1s, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-WRIT-

n]N

NcESSARY TO TAKE CASE OUT OF OPERATION OF STATUTE.-

A agrees in writing to accept certain real estate in compromise of
a suit at law. B orally agrees to convey. Subsequently thereto A
attempts to withdraw and announces intention of continuing his
action at law. B tenders deed and brings his bill asking for
specific performance and that A's suit be enjoined. Held, injunction and specific performance granted. Ruckman v. Hay,
114 S. E. 514 (W. Va. 1922).
A could not have sued B upon his oral promise to convey,
because such suit is expressly excluded by the terms of the STATrYI op FRAuDs, which in effect provides that no action shall be
brought upon any contract for the sale of land unless some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the party to
be charged. See W. VA. CODE, c. 98. The principal case is in
accord with the weight of authority, which treats this as a voidable
vontract allowing the party not signing to enforce the contract
against the party signing, thereby extending the privileges and
immunities of a class legally incompetent to a party who is legally
competent enabling such party to reap the advantages of a profitable bargain and escape the consequences of an unfavorable one.
-Penniman v. Hartsiorn, 13 Mass. 91; McCrea v. Purmont, 16
Wend. 460; Mountain Park Land Co. v. Snidow 77 W. Va. 54, 86
S. RL 915. The courts so holding apparently treat this as a voidable contract because the statute does not in terms preclude recovery by the party not signing against party who has signed. Don-
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ahue v. Rafferty, 82 W. Va. 535, 96 S. E. 535; Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., 67 W. Va. 589, 69 S. E. 195. The argument of the
courts which refuse a recovery to the party not signing against
the party signing is not that the statute precludes such recovery
in terms but that it robs the promise of the party not signing
of the element of enforceability, which makes it consideration
for the promise of the opposite party and that there is hence no
contract because of lack of consideration. Willebrant v. Sisters of
Mercy, 185 Mich. 366, 152 N. W. 85; Wilkinson v. Havendrick,
58 Mich. 574, 26 N. W. 139. The case of a party orally agreeing
to convey land bears an exact analogy to the case of an illusory
promise where it is held that such promise is not sufficient consideration to create a binding contract. Ellis v. Dodge, 237 Fed.
860; Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 83, 34 S. E.
923; Chicago & Great Eastern Ry. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240. The
sole difference is that an oral promise to convey land becomes defective because of legislative enactment, whereas in the case of an
illusory contract the defect is inherent in the promise. The legal
effect of the two promises is exactly the same, there being no detriment to the promisor or benefit to the promisee in either case. It
may be said that the same objection could be urged with equal
force to an infant's or insane person's promise. This objection is
easily disposed of on the ground that there the court is dealing
with a favored class. Here, there is no reason, the party being
legally competent, for extending the privilege. There being no
reason for allowing a recovery in the principal case, except the
fact that the statute does not expressly deny a recovery, it would
seem preferable to refuse a recovery on the grounds laid down
by the Michigan Court in Wilkinson v. Havendrick, supra.
-W. B. H.

MAsmR AND SERVANT-BoNus-NOT A GIFT-RECOvERAi3LE ON
WRONGFL DIscaAGE.-Employee was discharged without cause
before the specified length of time in which a bonus was to be paid,
Held, employer was liable for bonus on quantum meruit. The
offer was for faithful service and makes a supplementary contract
for benefit of which the employee could not be deprived without
cause. Roberts et ux v. Mays Mills, Inc., 114 S. E. 530 (W. Va.
1922).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss2/11

2

